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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CAN YOU RELATE? BRISTOL-MYERS NARROWED THE
RELATEDNESS REQUIREMENT BUT CHANGED LITTLE IN THE
SPECIFIC JURISDICTION ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION
Today, it is a basic principal that personal jurisdiction must be properly
established before a lawsuit can go forward. If a party so chooses, personal
jurisdiction can be waived and the court can continue to adjudicate the claim. 1
Often, however, defendants will challenge personal jurisdiction in order to get
the case dismissed from a particular forum. Despite the essentiality of personal
jurisdiction, the laws guiding the concept have never been truly settled, likely
because it is a product of court-made law stemming from Constitutional
penumbras rather than promulgated statutory rules. 2
The most recent development in the ever-evolving world of personal
jurisdiction comes from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bristol-Myers, 3 which
attempts to narrow the scope of the relatedness requirement of the specific
jurisdiction analysis. This article argues that the Court’s fact-specific holding
failed to establish a bright line test for finding a sufficient level of relatedness
between a plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s contact with a forum, and as
such, it will not greatly alter or impact the specific jurisdiction analysis. Further,
the opinion is not likely to result in a great degree of negative consequences for
plaintiffs litigating in mass actions.
Part I discusses the historical background of personal jurisdiction, including
relevant developments that have led to today’s specific jurisdiction analysis to
which the Bristol-Myers opinion adds. Part II discusses how two different states
took opposite positions on the relatedness requirement before the Supreme Court
decided the issue on appeal. Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the relatedness requirement and examines how lower courts have
subsequently applied the Bristol-Myers reasoning in personal jurisdiction
analyses. Finally, Part IV discusses the concerns raised by the opinion about
mass action litigation and attempts to dispel those concerns.

1. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
2. See i.e. Cal.C.C.P. § 410.10 (“A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.”).
3. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 137 S.
Ct. 1773 (2017).
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A.

Beginnings: Due Process and Personal Jurisdiction

The notion of personal jurisdiction has been developed based on the
concepts of territoriality and state sovereignty. 4 The first conception of personal
jurisdiction arose in 1877, when the Supreme Court held in the case of Pennoyer
v. Neff that a person’s consent or presence in the state was required in order for
him to be sued within a state. 5 The Court’s holding rested on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the policy that states should have
jurisdictional sovereignty over the people and property within them. 6
Ever since Pennoyer first applied constitutional limits to states’ exercise of
personal jurisdiction, there has been an abundance of confusion and frustration
because of the lack of a coherent theory to guide predictable outcomes. 7 To this
day, courts are still continuing and struggling to develop the law of personal
jurisdiction, piece by piece, but concerns of Due Process remain at the heart of
the issue. 8
B.

Minimum Contacts: International Shoe

Decades after Pennoyer, International Shoe considered when a person’s
presence in a state is sufficient under the Pennoyer framework to establish
personal jurisdiction. 9 The Court held Due Process requires that in order to
subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction, he must have certain minimum
contacts with the state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 10 The Court, in dicta,
considered a framework for what it considered to be sufficient minimum
contacts: if systematic and continuous contacts gave rise to the suit, jurisdiction
was proper; however, a single and isolated contact with the state, unconnected
to the suit, is insufficient to establish minimum contacts for jurisdictional
purposes. 11
There are also other in-between situations in which the minimum contact
analysis may be met. It is from these in-between situations that the notions of

4. Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in
the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1681 (2017).
5. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877).
6. Id.
7. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward A New Equilibrium
in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 207, 263 (2014).
8. Id. at 264 (2014) (arguing that a state must have authority to regulate conduct intended to
obtain benefits of its laws, otherwise, the essential element of sovereignty would be lost).
9. International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Compensation and
Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10. Id. at 316.
11. Id. at 318-19.
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general and specific jurisdiction were born. 12 General jurisdiction follows from
the court’s acknowledgment that there are times when continuous corporate
operations within a state are so substantial and of such a nature that suit is
justified in that state on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct
from those activities. 13 Further, specific jurisdiction follows from
acknowledgment that some isolated contacts, because of their nature, quality,
and the circumstances of their commission, may be sufficient to render a
corporation liable to suit in that state. 14
C. General Jurisdiction: Daimler and Goodyear
Goodyear and Daimler defined the current general jurisdiction test. 15 These
cases established that mere proof that a corporation does continuous and
systematic business in a state is insufficient for purposes of general
jurisdiction. 16 Such interpretation of general jurisdiction would be exceedingly
broad, and large national corporations were being subject to suit all over the
country. 17
The general jurisdiction inquiry is not whether a corporation’s in-state
contacts are merely continuous and systematic, but rather whether the
corporation’s affiliations with the state are so continuous and systematic as to
render it essentially at home in the forum state. 18 Daimler has established a
corporation can only be considered “at home” in the state of its incorporation
and in the state where it has its principal place of business. 19
D. Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction does not have a bright line test like the “at home” test
for general jurisdiction and has been developing and evolving ever since
International Shoe. In order to better shape the concept of specific jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court in McGee and Denckla elaborated on the minimum contacts
test, developing the idea of deliberate contacts – a defendant must have
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of exercising some business in the
state. 20

12. Patrick J. Borchers, Extending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2): A Way to
(Partially) Clean Up the Personal Jurisdiction Mess, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 413, 433 (2017).
13. Id.; International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
14. Id.
15. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 749 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011).
16. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761.
17. Id. at 761-62.
18. Id. at 761.
19. Id. at 760-61.
20. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
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In 1980, World-Wide Volkswagen built on the notion of deliberate contacts
and established the three-part specific personal jurisdiction test that is used
today. 21 The Court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutional
when: 1) the defendant purposefully availed himself of the forum state, or in
other words, he had contacts with the state and the contacts were purposeful and
deliberate; 2) the plaintiff’s claim arose out of those contacts; and 3) exercising
personal jurisdiction is reasonable based on a consideration of factors including
the state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in
convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most effective resolution, and the shared interest in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies. 22
Since then, the Supreme Court has further analyzed each of these three
factors. The Court has examined the element of purposeful availment many
times. 23 There is little dispute as to what constitutes a corporation purposefully
availing itself of a particular forum state, notwithstanding a lingering dispute
regarding whether placing goods in the stream of commerce satisfies purposeful
availment. 24 When in doubt whether purposeful availment is satisfied, facts
demonstrating reasonableness will influence the satisfaction of this element. 25
Until recently, the Supreme Court had neglected to further interpret the
second element of the World-Wide Volkswagen test – whether the plaintiff’s
claim arises out of the defendant’s purposeful availment or contacts with the
forum state, otherwise known as the “relatedness requirement.” 26 Several state
supreme courts delivered opinions on this issue, coming to opposite
conclusions. 27 The Supreme Court of the United States then granted certiorari
on one of those cases and attempted to shed light on whether this requirement is
met when the defendant is a nationwide company whose minimum contacts
reach every state, and a nonresident plaintiff is harmed in some way by the
defendant. 28

21. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
22. Id.
23. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790
(1984); Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S.
102, 112 (1987).
24. Asahi, 480 U.S. 1987 at 112.
25. Id.
26. Bristol-Myers Squibb Company v. Superior Court, 377 P.3d 874, 907 (Cal. 2016).
27. Id.; State ex rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41, 48 (Mo.
2017).
28. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1778 (2017).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2019]

CAN YOU RELATE?

509

II. DISAGREEMENT OVER THE SCOPE OF THE RELATEDNESS REQUIREMENT
Recently, two state supreme courts opined on the relatedness requirement,
reaching opposite interpretations of its scope. 29 The Supreme Court of California
held that the requirement was satisfied when nonresident plaintiffs were harmed
by the same type of harmful conduct in which the defendant was engaged in the
forum state. 30 In Missouri, the supreme court held that though the same type of
conduct occurred in the forum state, the plaintiff’s claims were not sufficiently
related to the forum contacts. 31 The reasoning from these cases and their dissents
influenced the Supreme Court’s opinion on the issue.
A.

Broad Interpretation: California Supreme Court
1.

Factual Background

In March 2012, eight complaints were filed in California state court on
behalf of 678 individuals against Bristol-Myers Squibb. 32 All of the individuals
named as plaintiffs in the suits had been prescribed and had taken Plavix, a drug
made by the defendant, and as a result suffered adverse consequences such as
bleeding, ulcers, heart attacks, stroke, and even death. 33 The complaints all
alleged causes of action sounding in California state law, but Bristol-Myers
Squibb argued that the court had no personal jurisdiction over it with regard to
the plaintiffs who were not California residents. 34
Of the 678 plaintiffs, only eighty-six were residents of California, while the
rest resided in thirty-three other states. 35 Bristol-Myers Squibb was incorporated
in Delaware, had its headquarters in New York, and had its most substantial
operations in New Jersey where it employed nearly 6,500 people. 36 In
comparison, Bristol-Myers Squibb only employed about 250 sales
representatives in California. 37 Although the company sold millions of Plavix
pills to distributors in California, the California sales of Plavix constituted just
over one percent of the company’s overall sales revenue. 38 Bristol-Myers Squibb
had a few research facilities and laboratories in California; however, there was
no evidence that these facilities did work on Plavix. 39

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See generally Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d 887; Norfolk Southern, 512 S.W.3d 48.
See Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 890-91.
See Norfolk Southern, 512 S.W.3d at 49.
Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 877, 878.
Id. at 878.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 879.
Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 879.
Id.
Id.
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Broad Application of the Relatedness Requirement

The California Supreme Court considered whether Bristol-Myers Squibb’s
contacts with California were sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction in
regards to the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims. 40 There was no question that
Bristol-Myers Squibb purposefully availed itself of California by marketing and
advertising there, employing sales representatives there, contracting with
distributors there, and operating facilities there. 41 Further, the court held that the
assertion of specific jurisdiction was not unreasonable. 42 Thus, the heart of the
dispute was whether the relatedness requirement was met.
The court ultimately concluded that the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims arose
out of or were connected to the defendant’s forum contacts and as such, personal
jurisdiction was proper. 43 The court employed a broad interpretation of the
relatedness requirement by using a “substantial connection” test, which instructs
that there must be a substantial nexus or connection between the defendant’s
activities in the forum and the plaintiff’s claim. 44 The court further explained
that a claim need not arise directly from, or be proximately caused by the
defendant’s contacts for jurisdiction to be proper; only when the operative facts
are not related to the defendant’s contacts can the cause of action be said to not
arise from the contact. 45
Applying this reasoning to the facts, the court held that the plaintiffs’ claims
did in fact arise out of the defendant’s California conduct. The company engaged
in a nationwide Plavix marketing and distribution campaign that reached
California and all other states alike, and this nationwide campaign created a
substantial nexus to the plaintiffs’ claims that dealt with said marketing and
distribution, including fraudulent advertising, design, manufacture, and
nondisclosure of material information about Plavix. 46 Further, Bristol-Myers
Squibb had several research and laboratory facilities located in California, and
the activities that took place in these facilities created an additional nexus to the
plaintiffs’ claims of negligent research, development, and design of the drug
itself. 47
The court rejected the idea that the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims were
merely parallel to the resident plaintiffs’ claims. Rather, the claims were all
based on a single, coordinated nationwide course of conduct directed from its

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 894.
Id. at 886-87.
Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 891-94.
Id. at 890-91.
Id. at 885, 887.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 888.
Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 888.
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headquarters and implemented across the country. 48 Thus, the nationwide
marketing and distribution in effect gave rise to all of the plaintiffs’ claims.
B.

Narrow Interpretation: Missouri Supreme Court
1.

Factual Background

In February of 2017, the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed the
relatedness requirement in a single-plaintiff personal injury case. 49 The plaintiff,
an Indiana resident, filed a personal injury action against Norfolk Southern
Railway for cumulative trauma sustained during his employment with the
company in Indiana. 50 The plaintiff filed suit in Missouri, and Norfolk Southern
argued that Missouri could not properly exercise personal jurisdiction over it. 51
Although Norfolk Southern did systematic and continuous business in
Missouri, those activities were insufficient for general jurisdiction for all causes
of action unrelated to that state. 52 Norfolk Southern, a Virginia company, had
railroad tracks running through Missouri as well as twenty-two other states. 53 It
had about 600 employees in Missouri, yet employed more than 600 people in
thirteen other states. 54 The company generated substantial revenue in Missouri,
but that revenue only comprised about two percent of the corporation’s overall
revenue. 55 Thus, the plaintiff was required to rely on specific jurisdiction. 56
Because the plaintiff did not plead any facts alleging that his injury arose
from the company’s Missouri activities, his claim for specific jurisdiction rested
on the argument that his injuries arose in Indiana from the same type of activities
that the defendant conducts in Missouri. He argued that because Norfolk
Southern engaged in railroad business in Missouri, and his injuries arose out of
railroad business in Indiana, the claims were sufficiently related to the
company’s contacts in Missouri. 57
2.

Narrow Application of the Relatedness Requirement

The Missouri Supreme Court rejected this argument and held there was no
specific jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. 58 Though Norfolk Southern
undoubtedly purposefully availed itself in Missouri, the suit could not be brought

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 889-90.
Dolan, 512 S.W.3d at 44.
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 45.
Norfolk Southern, 512 S.W.3d at 47.
Id.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
Id.
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in Missouri because the claims were not sufficiently related to the company’s
Missouri contacts. 59 No level of but-for causation connected the individual’s
personal injury allegations to the company’s presence in Missouri, and as such,
the claims did not arise out of the defendant’s purposeful availment of the
forum. 60
The court noted that the plaintiff’s argument employed a “pre-Daimler
approach.” 61 If a company did the same type of business all over the country, it
would become subject to specific jurisdiction in all states, thereby defeating the
distinction between specific and general jurisdiction. 62
Although Norfolk Southern differs in many ways from Bristol-Myers, in
both cases, plaintiffs argued that specific jurisdiction was proper when the
plaintiffs’ injuries arose from the same “type” of activities that the defendant
conducted in the forum state. California held that these sorts of parallel claims
constituted a substantial connection as to meet the relatedness element. 63
Missouri held otherwise. 64 The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari of the Bristol-Myers Squibb case to decide the issue. 65
III. CURRENT INTERPRETATION OF THE RELATEDNESS REQUIREMENT
In a June 19, 2017 opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the California
Supreme Court by way of reasoning similar to that employed by the Missouri
Supreme Court. 66 The holding effectively narrowed the scope of the relatedness
requirement, yet courts are still left much discretion in deciding what level of
causation or relatedness is sufficient for specific jurisdiction based on the facts
of each case.
A.

Narrowing the Scope: The Bristol-Myers Decision
1.

Due Process is the Ultimate Consideration

The Court’s opinion was predicated on the underlying two-fold policy
rationale for personal jurisdiction restrictions. The first concern is the burden
placed on the defendant – courts must assess any practical problems that would
result from requiring a defendant to litigate in a given forum. 67 Personal

59. Norfolk Southern, 512 S.W.3d at 49.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 50.
63. See Bristol-Myers, 377 P.3d at 878.
64. See Norfolk Southern, 512 S.W.3d at 44.
65. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 137 S.
Ct. 827, 827 (2017).
66. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1777.
67. Id. at 1780.
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jurisdiction restrictions thus act as a guarantee of immunity from burdensome,
inconvenient, or distant litigation. 68
The second concern is protection of federalism and the legitimate interests
of the states in adjudicating cases. 69 Personal jurisdiction restrictions ensure
certain territorial limitations and protect the sovereignty of the states. 70 The
Court suggested that this second concern overrides the first – even though
Bristol-Myers Squibb would suffer no inconvenience from litigating in
California, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate
federalism, nevertheless divests the state from adjudicating the controversy. 71
2.

Reversing the California Supreme Court

The Court ultimately reversed the California Supreme Court and held that
Bristol-Myers Squibb was not subject to specific jurisdiction in California with
regard to the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims. 72 It held that the plaintiffs’ claims,
arising merely from the same type of activities the defendant conducted in the
forum, were not sufficiently related to Bristol-Myers Squibb’s California
contacts. 73
In so holding, the Court relied on several important facts. First, the defendant
did not develop, manufacture, label, package, or create a marketing strategy for
Plavix in California. 74 Additionally, though the defendant contracted with
California distributors, the nonresident plaintiffs did not allege they obtained
Plavix through California sources, nor did they claim they were injured or
treated for injuries in California. 75 Finally, there was no evidence that Plavix
itself was designed or developed in any of the company’s California research or
laboratory facilities. 76
Considering the foregoing facts, the conduct that gave rise to the nonresident
plaintiffs’ claims occurred entirely outside of California. 77 Specific jurisdiction
is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from or connected with the very
controversy that establishes jurisdiction, and the court noted it could not be said
that the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims were derived from or connected to BristolMyers Squibb’s conduct in California. 78

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1780-81.
Id. at 1782.
Id. at 1781.
Id. at 1778.
Id.
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1779.
Id. at 1782.
Id. at 1780, 1782.
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Narrowing the Relatedness Requirement

The Court’s holding demonstrated an attempt to narrow the scope of the
relatedness requirement. The Court stated that “the mere fact that some plaintiffs
were prescribed, obtained, and ingested Plavix in California” and sustained
injuries similar to those of the nonresident plaintiffs, does not necessarily allow
California to convey jurisdiction over the nonresident plaintiffs’ claims. 79
Bristol-Myers Squibb’s relationship with third parties – here, the California
plaintiffs – was an insufficient basis for extension of jurisdiction to nonresidents,
even when the third parties brought similar claims. 80 The Court’s reasoning was
in line with the Missouri Supreme Court – rejecting the notion that out-of-state
claims arising from the same “type” of activity conducted by a defendant in the
forum state constitute a sufficient level of relatedness so as to say that the
plaintiffs’ claims arose out of the defendant’s contacts in the forum.
B.

Questions Remaining After Bristol-Myers

Two questions remained to be answered in light of the Supreme Court’s
decision. 81 The first question, whether the Bristol-Myers holding applies to mass
actions only or class actions alike, arises from Justice Sotomayor’s dissent where
she queries whether the opinion would also apply to a class action in which the
plaintiff injured in the forum state seeks to represent a nationwide class of
plaintiffs, not all of whom were injured there. 82 The second question, whether
the opinion is limited to only state courts or extends to federal courts, arises out
of the last sentence in the Bristol-Myers opinion, in which the Court leaves open
the question of whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on
the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court. 83
1.

Bristol-Myers Does Not Apply to Class Actions

The holding in Bristol-Myers applies only to mass actions and not class
actions. 84 This is first evidenced by the majority’s assertion that its holding was
consistent with Shutts. 85 In Shutts, the Court held it was consistent with Due
Process to exercise personal jurisdiction over the claims of nonresident class

79. Id. at 1781.
80. Id.
81. See Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-00564 NC, 2017 WL
4224723 at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017).
82. Id. at *8; Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 n.4.
83. Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723 at *7; Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1784.
84. See Robert S. Peck, Constricting Personal Jurisdiction, 53 TRIAL 26, 30 (“Defendants
have already begun to argue that Bristol-Myers precludes class actions that involve out-of-state
class members. The discussion of class actions in the decision, though, gives little credence to that
claim.”).
85. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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members despite them having no minimum contacts with the forum state. 86 A
state’s authority to resolve the claims of nonresident plaintiff class members,
however, is entirely distinct from its authority to exercise jurisdiction over an
out-of-state defendant. 87
Further, Bristol-Myers applies only to mass actions because the citizenship
of unnamed plaintiffs in class actions is not taken into account for personal
jurisdiction purposes; the class action device expressly extends personal
jurisdiction over unnamed class members. 88 This is so because the term “party”
indicates the applicability of certain procedural rules such as establishing proper
personal jurisdiction, 89 but in class actions, unnamed class members are not
named on the complaint as parties in interest, and as such, do not need to
establish proper personal jurisdiction. 90 On the other hand, in mass actions such
as in Bristol-Myers, each plaintiff is named as a party in interest and must
establish proper personal jurisdiction. 91
2.

Bristol-Myers Applies to Federal Courts Sitting in Diversity

The holding in Bristol-Myers applies to federal courts whose subject-matter
jurisdiction arises solely out of diversity jurisdiction. First, the Court’s statement
was not an expression of a holding that its decision would not apply to a federal
court; it was merely a refusal to opine on a question not before it since the facts
did not involve a federal court. 92 Additionally, federal courts routinely apply
specific jurisdiction analyses to defendants that are before them solely on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction, as the claims in such cases sound in state law. 93
When this happens, the concerns of Due Process and state sovereignty, as well
as the burden on the defendant, remain prevalent. 94
When a federal court entertains only questions of federal law, however, a
categorical extension of the Bristol-Myers opinion to federal courts is not
warranted. 95 The Bristol-Myers opinion centered on due process and the
question of state sovereignty, but when a case is pending in federal court on the
basis of federal question subject-matter jurisdiction, no such concerns are
raised. 96 This is because federal courts all represent the same federal sovereign,

86. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1782-83.
87. Id.
88. Peck, supra note 84, at 26, 30.
89. Devlin v. Scardelliti, 536 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2002).
90. Fitzhenry-Russell, 2017 WL 4224723 at *5.
91. Id.
92. Id. at *4.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Monteville Sloan v. General Motors LLC, 16-CV-07244-EMC, 2018 WL 784049, at *6
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2018).
96. Id. at *7.
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not the sovereignty of a foreign state government. 97 Thus, the decisive factor in
a state court’s analysis, as recognized and applied by Bristol-Myers, becomes
irrelevant for the federal court. 98
C. Relatedness Requirement After Bristol-Myers
1.

The Scope of the Relatedness Requirement Remains Unclear

The Court’s opinion makes certain that parallel conduct inside the forum or
a defendant’s similar contacts with third parties in the forum do not establish a
sufficient connection for a nonresident’s claims to meet the requisite relatedness
requirement. However, despite the Court’s attempt to narrow the scope of the
relatedness element, it left no bright line rule for determining exactly what level
of connection would be sufficient to prove a plaintiff’s claim arises out of a
defendant’s contact with a forum state. The Court neglected to adopt an express
test such as “substantial connection” or “but-for causation” leaving courts very
little substantial guidance.99
The strictest reading of the opinion would lead to the conclusion that a
defendant’s contacts in the forum state must be the proximate cause of a
plaintiff’s claim. However, recent applications of Bristol-Myers suggest that the
connection need not be that stringent. 100 Rather, some lower level of but-for
causation is sufficient – as long as the defendant’s conduct was in the causal
chain leading to the plaintiff’s suit, the contact was sufficiently related and
specific jurisdiction was met. 101
For example, in Feller, a plaintiff sued for breach of contract due to an
increase in price of an insurance policy. 102 The policy was originally priced by
the defendant company in California, but the increase ultimately came to fruition
when the company was located in its new headquarters in Iowa. 103 The
allegation of breach was premised upon the original pricing of the policy and
subsequent increase of that price; therefore, the original pricing of the policies
was a link in the causal chain leading to the breach of contract injury, and
specific jurisdiction in California was proper. 104 Though the outcome in Feller

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Rhodes & Robinson, supra note 7 (explaining that “arises out of” implies that nearly
all of the events giving rise to the suit took place in the forum, whereas “related to” and “connected
to” are weaker terms implying that the conduct may be part of the chain of events leading to a
claim, but perhaps not the basis for liability itself).
100. See Feller v. Transamerica Life Ins. Co., No. 216CV01378CASAJWX, 2017 WL 6453262
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2017).
101. Id. at *4.
102. Id. at *1.
103. Id. at *6.
104. Id.
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was in line with Bristol-Myers, Bristol-Myers did not mandate a standard of butfor causation for the relatedness test; rather, the Feller court adopted this
reasoning at its own discretion.
2.

The Relatedness Requirement is Fact-Intensive

One certainty following Bristol-Myers is that the relatedness requirement
analysis will continue to be fact-intensive. In establishing whether specific
jurisdiction is proper, courts must examine very specific facts linking the
defendant’s forum behavior to a plaintiff’s claim. For example, in Cortina, the
court used the Bristol-Myers analysis and found specific jurisdiction based on
findings of fact that nearly every clinical trial involved in studying the drug
Plavix occurred in California. 105 Because the basis for plaintiffs’ claim was the
inadequacy of the clinical trials performed on Plavix, the court held the
California activities were sufficient to create a direct connection between the
defendant’s forum conduct and the plaintiffs’ claim. 106
3.

Jurisdictional Discovery Becomes Critical

The fact-intensiveness of the relatedness inquiry will result in an increase of
crucial jurisdictional discovery, since before there was little reason to explore
the affiliation between the defendant and the underlying cause of action to
establish jurisdiction. 107 This notion was acknowledged in In Re Nexus, where
plaintiffs experiencing defects with their smartphones sued the two companies
who developed the phones, Huawei and Google, in California. 108 Huawei moved
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the question was how much
evidence would be sufficient to establish the plaintiffs’ claims arose out of
Huawei’s conduct in California. 109
Unlike in Bristol-Myers, where there was no proof that the research done in
California was related to Plavix itself, here there were some facts that showed
Huawei’s research and development efforts in California focused on Android
interoperability – software used by Google. 110 This left open the possibility that
Huawei did perform relevant development of the product in California and the
plaintiffs’ claims arose directly out of this conduct. 111 As a result, the court held
that limited jurisdictional discovery should take place regarding how much of
Huawei’s research and development of the relevant smartphone took place in
105. Cortina v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 17-CV-00247-JST, 2017 WL 2793808, at *4
(N.D. Cal. June 27, 2017).
106. Id.
107. Peck, supra note 84, at 29-30.
108. In re Nexus 6P Products Liability Litigation, No. 17-CV-02185-BLF, 2018 WL 827958,
at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018)
109. Id. at *1-2, *5.
110. Id. at *5.
111. Id.
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California. 112 Following the Bristol-Myers opinion, more courts are sure to
follow these footsteps in allowing more jurisdictional discovery.
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS ON MASS LITIGATION
The decision in Bristol-Myers was largely agreed upon by the Supreme
Court, as eight justices supported the majority, while only Justice Sotomayor
dissented. 113 Her dissent raised concerns that may be shared by many plaintiffs’
attorneys handling nationwide mass actions. 114 However, because the BristolMyers decision has not greatly impacted the specific jurisdiction analysis, the
concerns raised are not likely to come to fruition, negatively impacting plaintiffs
in mass actions. Further, while the concerns are valid, judicial vehicles such as
savings statutes, multidistrict litigation, and class actions act to counter the
potential negative effects of the decision.
A.

The Dissent’s Concerns of Unfairness

Justice Sotomayor disagreed with the majority that the nonresident
plaintiffs’ claims were not sufficiently related to the defendant’s contacts in
California. She argued that just because those plaintiffs were injured in other
states did not mean their claims did not relate to the advertising and distribution
efforts of Bristol-Myers Squibb in California. 115 Her argument suggests that the
relatedness requirement should be decided using a substantial connection or
similar test rather than a more stringent test of proximate or but-for causation. 116
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent is steeped in concerns that a narrow
interpretation of the relatedness element will result in considerable unfairness,
eliminating plaintiffs’ ability to hold corporations fully accountable for
nationwide conduct and giving corporations a tool to prevent aggregation of
claims. 117 First, she asserts that going forward, it will be profoundly difficult to
aggregate the claims of plaintiffs injured across the country to sue a defendant
in a single, isolated action. 118 Likewise, she claims it may become impossible to
bring certain nationwide mass actions at all against defendants at home in
different states or force plaintiffs to sue in far-flung jurisdictions. 119 Finally, she
claims that the majority’s decision will result in unnecessary piecemeal
legislation and bifurcation of claims. 120 Though valid, Justice Sotomayor’s
concerns hold little weight when scrutinized.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at *5-6.
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1784 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Peck, supra note 84, at 28.
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1784, 1789.
Id. at 1789.
Id.
Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1784.
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Bristol-Myers Does Not Greatly Diminish the Plaintiffs’ Forum Options

The Bristol-Myers decision has not altered much, if any, of the personal
jurisdiction analysis—plaintiffs’ options for proper forums are not any narrower
than before. 121 After Tyrell, plaintiffs feared that representation of injured
railroad workers would become difficult, as proper jurisdiction would be limited
to where the plaintiff was injured, where the railroad is incorporated, and where
it has its principal place of business. 122 Plaintiffs also feared it would become
difficult to sue corporations in state court for out-of-state injuries or resort to
traveling to the defendant’s home state to sue no matter how far this would
require the plaintiff to travel. 123 Justice Sotomayor’s concerns directly mirror
these sentiments, but Bristol-Myers did not create any restriction on personal
jurisdiction narrower than those which Tyrell had already established—
jurisdiction is proper where the plaintiff was injured, or where general
jurisdiction is proper.
Considering Bristol-Myers did not alter the holding presented Tyrell, it will
not become “profoundly difficult” 124 for plaintiffs across the nation to aggregate
their claims and sue a defendant in a single, isolated action. First, plaintiffs have
the option of joining together and filing mass actions in their home state where
specific jurisdiction is proper. 125 Second, plaintiffs may still bring nationwide
mass actions in any state where the defendant is subject to general
jurisdiction. 126 In Bristol-Myers, the plaintiffs could have properly sued in
Delaware, New York, or possibly even New Jersey. 127
Bringing suit in a forum of general jurisdiction would not have resulted in
any increased inconvenience to the plaintiffs—no particular state was home to a
majority of the plaintiffs in the action, so no matter where the consolidated action
was brought, most plaintiffs would have been litigating in a remote forum. 128
121. See BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) (Like in Bristol-Myers, the Tyrell
court found that state courts could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a railroad merely because
it did some business in the forum state. The Court relied on Goodyear and Daimler as well as due
process concerns in holding that general jurisdiction was improper because the defendant was
neither incorporated nor had its principle place of business in the forum state, and specific
jurisdiction was appropriate with respect to only those claims related to business the defendant
actually conducted in the forum state).
122. Jeffrey White, Switching Tracks on Jurisdiction, 54 TRIAL 56 (Feb. 2018).
123. Recent Case, B.N.S.F. Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 131 HARV. L. REV. 333, 341–42 (2017).
124. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1789.
125. Id. at 1783.
126. Id.
127. Id. (Although Bristol-Myers Squibb’s headquarters was located in New York, general
personal jurisdiction may be appropriate in New Jersey, where the company maintained substantial
operations, under the nerve center test set forth by the Court in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77,
80-81 (2010)).
128. Id. at 1783–84 (Ninety-two plaintiffs were from Texas, eighty-six plaintiffs were from
California, and seventy-one plaintiffs were from Ohio).
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Plaintiffs may desire to choose a forum other than one of general jurisdiction
because of friendlier laws or courtrooms, yet this type of forum shopping has
long been looked down upon. 129 The benefit of Bristol-Myers in reducing forum
shopping outweighs any potential inconvenience to plaintiffs.
C. Judicial Vehicles Counter the Negative Implications of Bristol-Myers
1.

Savings Statutes Protect Affected Plaintiffs’ Claims

Those most affected by the Bristol-Myers opinion were those involved in
talcum power litigation against corporate giant Johnson & Johnson. Thousands
of plaintiffs across the county sued Johnson & Johnson alleging that the talcum
powder in their products caused ovarian cancer. 130 Mass actions were brought
in plaintiff-friendly Missouri by plaintiffs who had never had any contact with
the state, under a theory used by the plaintiffs in Bristol-Myers—they were
harmed out-of-state by the same type of activities that Johnson & Johnson
conducted in Missouri. 131 If nonresident plaintiffs were not able to properly
invoke joinder to keep their cases in the mass action, they felt the immediate
impact of the Bristol-Myers decision. 132 In some cases, Johnson & Johnson
immediately removed to federal court, and in others, judges declared mistrials
and ended litigation when ninety-five percent of plaintiffs were from other
states. 133
Though some may experience inconvenience or frustration by having their
case dismissed from a jurisdiction known for doling out large awards to
plaintiffs, Bristol-Myers will not be detrimental to their claims because savings
statutes ultimately allow those plaintiffs to still have their day in court. 134 Nearly
every state has some version of a savings statute—a law allowing a plaintiff to
re-file her claim in a state within a certain period of time after it was dismissed
elsewhere for lack of jurisdiction. 135 These statutes allow plaintiffs to re-file
their claims even after the statute of limitations for the claim has expired, as long
129. See Williams v. Bowman, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (A plaintiff’s
choice of forum is accorded deference unless there is any indication that it is the result of forum
shopping).
130. Joel Currier, Talcum Powder Lawsuits Find a Home in St. Louis – For Now, ST. LOUIS
POST DISPATCH, (May 21, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/talcumpowder-lawsuits-find-a-home-in-st-louis-for/article_64762c56-7046-59a5-b848-6c5c4f7343
44.html [https://perma.cc/6XHJ-2CSX].
131. Id.
132. Id.; see also Peck, supra note 84, at 29–30 (referencing Swann v. Johnson & Johnson, No.
1422CC09326-01 (E.D. Mo. June 19, 2017)).
133. Peck, supra note 84, at 29.
134. See generally C. T. Drechsler, Annotation, Statute Permitting New Action After Failure of
Original Action Commenced Within Period of Limitation, as Applicable in Cases Where Original
Action Failed For Lack of Jurisdiction, 6 A.L.R.3d 1043 (1966) (updated weekly).
135. Id.
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as their original suit was filed in good faith within the proper statutory period. 136
Thus, plaintiffs whose ongoing litigation was interrupted by the decision are still
able to pursue relief in a proper jurisdiction.
Because Bristol-Myers does not apply to class actions, plaintiffs involved in
mass actions will not be disadvantaged if their claims must be separated and refiled. If the holding were to apply to class actions, thereby eliminating
jurisdiction over nonresident class members, a plaintiff might be dissuaded from
re-asserting her claim because it is not worth enough to pursue individually. 137
Mass actions, however, are different in that each plaintiff pursues her own
individual, often high value claim, and so her ability to recover will not be
limited by re-filing in another proper jurisdiction. 138
2.

Multidistrict Litigation Relives Concerns of Future Mass Action
Litigation

Although the Brisol Myers opinion does not hinder plaintiffs’ ability to file
statewide mass actions where specific jurisdiction is proper, there is concern that
more statewide mass actions and fewer nationwide mass actions will result in
piecemeal legislation or bifurcation of claims. This in turn may result in disuniformity in laws and a decrease in judicial economy. 139
Multidistrict litigation serves as one resolution to both of these problems for
those cases that are removable to federal district courts. 140 Multidistrict litigation
promotes efficiency by taking actions filed across many states and in many
districts and keeping them in one forum, eliminating the wasteful duplicative
efforts of courts. 141 It also ameliorates discovery challenges that arise from
multiple horizontal litigations. 142 Multidistrict litigation further promotes
uniformity in the law. 143 Courts have an interest in not having the rulings of one
district judge undermine those of another, so multidistrict litigation acts to

136. Id.
137. Alexandra D. Lahav, Mass Tort Class Actions - Past, Present, and Future, 92 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 998, 999–1000, 1009–10 (2017).
138. Id. at 1009–10.
139. Gluck, supra note 4, at 1682–83 (2017); see also Judith Resnik, Reorienting the Process
Due: Using Jurisdiction to Forge Post-Settlement Relationships Among Litigants, Courts, and the
Public in Class and Other Aggregate Litigation, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1017, 1024–31 (2017)
(Arguments against aggregation are often framed as problems of due process including disuniformity of interests and uneven successes of remedy distribution).
140. Gluck, supra note 4, at 1682–83 (Multidistrict litigation is one way of combining class
actions and individual claims regarding one central issue into a single forum for pre-trial
proceedings).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1683.
143. Id.
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prevent jurisdiction wars. 144 By having one forum control the cases from across
the country, multidistrict litigation eliminates issues of forum shopping. 145
3.

Class Actions Can Be an Alternative

One final implication that the decision may have is an increase in class
actions for nationwide aggregation. 146 Although traditionally, mass toxic tort
cases have been considered more appropriate for mass litigation rather than class
action, 147 there has been an increase in tort aggregation, to the point that it has
become commonplace. 148 In both class action rules and personal jurisdiction
laws alike, the concern is the legitimacy of a court’s authority to bind litigants. 149
The class device, as part of the development of aggregate litigation,
demonstrates a willingness to expand jurisdiction over nonresidents, and will
serve as an adequate alternative to those affected by Bristol-Myers. 150
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Bristol-Myers narrowed the scope of the relatedness
requirement of specific jurisdiction in holding that when a nonresident plaintiff
is injured by merely the same type of activity the defendant conducted in the
forum, the plaintiff’s claim is not sufficiently related to the defendant’s forum
contacts in order to establish specific personal jurisdiction. Despite this holding,
the Court failed to adopt a bright line test for determining what level of
connection between the defendant’s forum contacts and the plaintiff’s claim is
sufficient to meet this relatedness requirement.
Because the Bristol-Myers holding did not significantly alter the specific
jurisdiction analysis, courts are still left with freedom to determine what
connections establish relatedness based on the facts of individual cases. While
the decision may give rise to an increase in jurisdictional discovery, it will not
result in negative consequences for mass action plaintiffs. Plaintiffs remain free
to pursue aggregated actions in the places where the plaintiffs can establish that
the defendant’s activities gave rise to their claim, or where the defendant is
subject to general jurisdiction.

144. Id.
145. Gluck, supra note 4, at 1685.
146. See generally Robert H. Klonoff, Class Actions Part II: A Respite from the Decline, 92
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97 (2017) (Class actions are on the rise from a recent decline, and Bristol-Myers
may help act as a reprieve from years of case law adverse to class action aggregation).
147. See Gluck, supra note 4, at 1684–85 (In personal injury cases, individual questions of
causation, damages, and applicable law often require state by state evaluation).
148. Resnik, supra note 139, at 1025 (Mass torts constitute ninety percent of multidistrict
litigation).
149. Id. at 1026.
150. Id.
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Judicial resources like savings statutes, multidistrict litigation, and class
actions act as safeguards to some of the negative implications the decision would
have otherwise had. As such, the future of mass action litigation is safe in the
wake of Bristol-Myers.
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